Racial profiling is a myth. The facts on crime, the methods of the researchers and the composition of the LAPD shows that the ACLU report is seriously flawed. It has earned many subsequent refutations on statistical grounds. The ACLU has come to the same conclusions in every major American city without exception. The real issue is that there is no benchmark by which to measure if “too many” of one group are stopped or frisked. Using population figures is flawed for many reasons (see below). There is no explanation as to why the people were stopped, unless one either argues a) people are pulled over for no reason, which no one claims, or b) that poor driving is more common in non-white communities. This can be the only benchmark, which the report ignores (cf MacDonald, 2004).

Much of the crime in Los Angeles city is gang related (roughly half). Yet, out of 463 identified gangs, 11 are white, with a total of 600 members. Hispanics alone have 246 gangs with almost 22,000 members. The city of Los Angeles and the California Department of Justice refused to collect and more demographic information on gangs after 2005 (which itself, begs an explanation). The LAPD itself has about 9,000 members. Whites make up about 30% of LA's urban population.

While the report states that disparities in crime are controlled for, there is no evidence for that in the report itself. The report claims that this would not be important regardless, and, probably, there is no evidence that there is a racial dimension of crime (which is from the report itself, see pages 4-5). The refusal to deal with gang demographics makes this assumption a serious flaw. Even more, the ACLU's definition of “minority neighborhood” is also problematic, since the nature of a population and the nature of its crimes are two separate variables, especially in times of high mobility.

Yet, the ACLU reports does not deal with these facts. It must be significant in terms of law enforcement. The police department of Los Angeles is only 37% white, and the force itself has engaged in affirmative action hiring and sensitivity training since at least 1992. The Los Angeles Times reports that over 70% of citizens of the city approve of the police department. It is difficult to connect this to any profiling.

The Report states on page 27:

But, as emphasized by the Analysis Report, these substantial and statistically significant racial disparity estimates by themselves do not provide conclusive or incontrovertible evidence that the LAPD engaged in race-contingent profiling or even that policing decisions produced unjustified disparate impacts. Most importantly, the post-stop regressions in this report were not able to control for the race-specific criminality of the people who were stopped or the race-specific crime rates in the areas where the stops occurred (emphasis mine)
This admission is telling, since it does not connect stops, frisks, and results with race-based crimes or regions. It does not say why these people were pulled over. Using population figures alone tells us nothing. For example, Hollywood, which has a low black population, also has many clubs that attract large numbers of black and Hispanic gang members. This problem is not dealt with in the report.

Most of all, the much higher crime rates of both Hispanic and black residents are not controlled for in the report either, whether gang related or not. 34% of murder victims were black, with suspects being about 36%. Hispanic murder victims were about 54% of the total. In both cases, the victims and suspects are far larger than their demographics in LA would suggest. Blacks, for example, are about 11% of the population. Since much of this is gang related, and white gangs are almost non-existent, disparate treatment is built into the crime rate itself.

Relative to the gang population, blacks and Hispanics are stopped less than an unbiased law enforcement officer should be. The very fact that the LAPD is mostly non-white, the report is flawed as it stands, since it does not prove what the authors want it to. Skin color is assumed to be the only criterion, which ruins the statistical importance of the report. It deals only with consenting searches, and does not deal with a) searches where no race was listed and b) searches that were denied. The only way that this report would work is if we assumed that crime was spread out evenly over the whole LA urban population and, of course, that the LAPD was mostly white.

In her “Myth of Racial Profiling,” dealing with a nearly identical ACLU report concerning Philadelphia, author Heather MacDonald writes,

No traffic-stop study to date comes near the requisite sophistication. Most simply compare the number of minority stops with some crude population measure, and all contain huge and fatal data gaps. An ACLU analysis of Philadelphia traffic stops, for example, merely used the percentage of blacks in the 1990 census as a benchmark for stops made seven years later. In about half the stops that the ACLU studied, the officer did not record the race of the motorist. The study ignored the rate of traffic violations by race, so its grand conclusion of selective enforcement is meaningless (MacDonald 2001).

Even more, police training is clear. People get pulled out of cars due to behavior: signs of nervousness, a threatening demeanor, or lack of tags. The report assumes that none of this is relevant, though it does so without proof of any kind. MacDonald also cites statistics, one set from the New Jersey Turnpike, that blacks speed at about twice the rate of whites. Hence, they are pulled over more. In her 2004 article on the Northeastern University study that is similar to the ACLU's, she says,

Most egregiously, the profiling researchers ignore the relationship between community crime rates and police presence. Calls from crime victims bring officers disproportionately into minority neighborhoods, because that is where violence is highest. Responsive commanders will target policing strategies in those same neighborhoods, to protect the most vulnerable residents. A greater police presence in an area usually produces more citations.

The same reasoning can apply to the ACLU, since they too, do not deal with this simple
fact. There is no evidence that people are pulled over or frisked due to skin color. This is especially the case with the LAPD, which has relatively few white officers in an already tiny and overworked force. The LAPD is outmanned and outgunned by the gang population, almost entirely non-white, and, as of 2005, numbers almost 100,000 well armed members.

There is also no reason why police would frisk non-whites more, especially if a) they will get into serious trouble for doing so “too many times” and b) these actions did not stop crime. This needs to be explained. The reader is supposed to believe that, based only on population figures in a few regions, a mostly non-white LAPD deliberately frisks non-whites more than whites, even though it gets the LAPD into trouble and produces few results.

How much is a cop’s life worth? Judging by media attention, not much. On June 22, a black man shot a sheriff’s deputy in Seattle several times in the head with the deputy's own gun, killing him instantly. The deputy had been trying to restrain the man, just out of jail for assaulting another officer, as he ran naked through traffic pounding on cars. The case raises troubling questions about whether the ubiquitous crusade to portray cops as racist has resulted in a potentially lethal reluctance to use necessary force. But in the three weeks since the killing occurred, the incident has received only two mentions in the press outside Seattle — an article in the New York Times, and a passing allusion on CNN.

Compare the media tsunami around the Inglewood, Ca., angry-cop case. In the first nine days after an Inglewood officer was videotaped slugging auffed black teen once in the head, 370 stories on the event, or 41 a day, flooded the nation's airwaves and presses. The attorney general spoke out against the Inglewood police; the Justice Department mobilized its local and national investigators; Al Sharpton and Johnnie Cochran descended upon Inglewood to pump up protest; a grand jury returned an assault indictment against the officer in record time; and the ever-gratifying narrative about rampant, racist police brutality is once again pulsating through the country (MacDonald, 2002).

The above is quite typical of the portrayal of (white) police officers in the American media. Almost designed to deliberately inflame the public, or especially, non-whites against the police and white people in general, such disparate treatment needs to be explained.

One approach is called by Harvard researchers “implicit bias.” This refers to subconscious biases and prejudices, often inculcated, knowingly or not, by major media sources over time. The Harvard Study came to the following conclusions:

1. Implicit bias is everywhere and extremely pervasive.
2. Most of the time, people are unaware of them.
3. These prejudices are significant in predicting human behavior.
4. People differ in the level of prejudice as well as the targets, intensity and propensity to translate bias into action.

In terms of racial bias, the seminal article by Judge M. Bennett of the US District Court in (northern) Iowa, explains that the Harvard study mentioned above shows racial bias (implicitly) in blacks and whites against each other, studies have repeatedly shown this is not the case among police officers. Yet, this study only confirmed the earlier work of Devine (1989) who showed the
same thing. More than likely, police training and community sensitivity are behind this clear colorblindness.

The 1986 case *Batson v Kentucky* is a problem. The details of the case are clear: Batson was a black man who was facing burglary charges. Both the prosecution and the defense were challenging jury selection due to racial makeup. Eventually, due to the fighting that entailed among the judge, the prosecution and the defense, the jury ended up being all white. Batson was convicted. The state court ruled, citing precedent, that bias needs to be proven, not just assumed on the exclusively basis that those making the decision were white. Going to the US Supreme Court, the state court was overruled.

The court stated that the mere fact that the jury was white, and that the prosecution was worried that black jurors will not convict a black man, that, as a result, Batson was not given a fair trial. The dissent in that case stated that this attacked the entire concept of jury challenges by either prosecution or defense, and implicitly states that, while whites are discriminatory, blacks are not. This case set the standard that a double standard is, in fact acceptable.

The problem of implicit bias is that it is often undetected, difficult to measure, and makes a mockery out of reason and modern democracy. If these biases are as pervasive as the empirical work claims, then human reason loses its force. It also points the finger at major media, whose influence over these hidden biases is immense.

In the now-famous George Mason study of impacts on public opinion relative to the police, the researchers conclude, among other things

> Large portions of the American public report using the mass media as their primary source of information about crime, and these stories are the context for most mass media accounts of police work. News and entertainment media portray police and police work in a highly distorted fashion. The recent trend toward “tabloid-style” journalism – even in mainstream media – appears to reduce public confidence and trust in the police.

This admission is chilling, since it affects the quality of police work and is manipulative towards the public. Several questions present themselves:

1. **How is it in the interest of the police to act in an unprofessional way?** Police are undoubtedly worried about their public image and want good community relations, it seems absurd and irrational that, systematically, police would behave in any but the best of manners. With, of course, the occasional mistake. The question is: what's in it for them? It seems nothing at all except bad press, humiliation and violence. So why would they do it?

2. **In the inner cities in the US – generally speaking – police officers are mostly non-white.** In Los Angeles, for example, the percentage of white officers is about 30% of the total. Hence, concepts of racial bias and profiling seem oddly out of place. So why the stress on race in inner city policing?

3. **What is the interest of the media in deliberately misrepresenting facts.** NBC admitted deliberately doctoring tapes in the Travyon Martin case to make Zimmerman look like a racist. Zimmerman himself is presently suing NBC for this. In 1992, the testimony of the police officers in the Rodney King beating were not aired on television, nor was the testimony of the numerous black officers involved even mentioned. The book, *Presumed
Guilty, which presented the side of the police in this matter, was not published by any mainstream press. It went to a small conservative press instead and was largely ignored. Why?

4. The Today Show also deliberately manipulated the recordings of Zimmerman, who was called “white” when, in fact, he is Hispanic. The doctored recording stated: “This guy looks like he's up to no good. He looks black.” Yet, once the fraud was revealed, the true statement made in the undoctored recording stated: Zimmerman: “This guy looks like he's up to no good. Or he's on drugs or something. It's raining and he's just walking around, looking about.” Dispatcher: “OK, and this guy--is he black, white or Hispanic?” Zimmerman: “He looks black.” No explanation has been forthcoming for the deliberate plan to inflame black opinion. Yet, there can be no question that it occurred. Why?

Paul Kellstedt, in his 2003 work Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes, clearly chronicles and describes media manipulation over time. For example, he deals with media coverage on Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. The focus was exclusively on black, inner city problems. Since the majority of poor in the US are white and quite often rural, this bias seemed odd. The problem then became, a) that poverty was seen as “black,” and b) that blacks, presumably, would get the benefit of federal largesse. At the same time, c) white poverty will be ignored. This can go in two ways: one can argue that blacks are stigmatized as “poor” and hence socially problematic, or, alternatively, that ignoring white poverty turns them into subhumans who do not deserve assistance. The regular use of the terms “redneck” and “white trash” as socially acceptable slurs strongly suggest the latter.

The Huffington Post, in an article by former journalist Charlie Reina (a political moderate), suggests that media manipulation on race, and ideology in general, is based on that generation that came of age in the 1960s. Motivated by the desire to end racism, a culture developed in the media that whites, especially whites with power, could do little that was right, while blacks always played the role of victims. This, of course, is pure mythology, and yet, might explain the interests of the press in their biased reporting in the Trayvon Martin or Rodney King cases.

However one looks at it, however, media are a branch of government, capable of creating and manipulating public opinion at will. Whether or not they are morally or intellectually capable of handling this responsibility, or whether they should have it at all, is another question. The media's handling of crime and American police-work is criminal.

English police practice emphasized stopping crime before it begins. Deterrence is often the result of a strong police presence in an area, or other visible signs of law enforcement activity. According to Roberg et al (2005) there are four theories that explain the development of modern police forces in the US.

The first claims that disorder was so prevalent in cities that a professionally trained phalanx of officers was necessary to keep the peace. The second theory relates to crime as such, rather than disorder in general. It holds that as crime rates grew in urban areas, police forces were formed to combat it. The first theory deals with generalized violence and disorder. The third theory is popular among writers on the left, who claim that as economic relations became less equal, the creation of coercive agencies was necessary to keep the poor from stealing from the rich. Finally, there is a strange theory that says the establishment of professional police forces is based on imitation of other areas (Roberg, et al 2005).

Yet, in order to be effective, the police force needed to be ethical, efficient and selfless.
Of course, this is a tall order for any profession. In 1929, President Hoover established the Wickersham Commission in the midst of prohibition. The commission famously found that police, when enforcing prohibition, were particularly violent and often used torture tactics. This led to a flurry of reforms.

In 1965, something called the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was convened by President LB Johnson. The results of the report claimed that crime was becoming an epidemic and very difficult to control. New training methods for police were needed, more courts should be established due to backlogs, and reduce the use of prisons as punishment. Johnson wanted to see the federal government begin engaging local police forces on new tactics on manpower usage, communications, tactics, and the use of force. Relative to the topic at hand, Johnson made one very revealing statement:

It has been said that the fault lies in poor living conditions, limited education, and the denial of opportunity. Plainly, laws are less likely to command the respect of those forced to live at the margins of our society. Stability and order have little meaning and small advantage to those who exist in poverty, hopelessness, and despair. The long-run solution to the view of crime is jobs, education and hope. This is a goal to which this country is now committed. But we should remember that not all crime is committed by those who are impoverished or those denied equal opportunity. In any event, we cannot postpone our responsibilities to act against crimes committed today. It has also been said that the fault lies in a deep moral decay, particularly among the young; that juvenile delinquency and high crime rates among younger adults have their origins in this decay.

In terms of modern police practice, the day to day struggles of policemen need to be taken seriously. They are often seen as emotionless machines. They are not. In fact, their behavior is crafted by the nature of the criminals they fight rather than the mere fact of being a cop. Crank (1998) holds that there are four pillars for daily police work in modern America: coercion, unpredictability, solidarity, and the ability to be flexible.

Warren v. District of Columbia (1981) was a landmark case concerning police work. In 1975, two roommates heard their apartment being broken into. They called the police and asked for immediate assistance, since they were in the house. The assailant then raped them. The police, arriving a few minutes later, did not come up to the apartment, but only looked around outside. When the rapist realized the police were there, he took them away to his “hideout” and tortured them for 14 hours.

Warren lost the case. Even though the police were incompetent in this regard, the law was laid down that police do *not* have the duty to keep crimes from occurring and as such, have no blanket duty to any specific individual (*Warren v. District of Columbia*, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. Ct. of Ap., 1981). This means that while police must investigate crimes, it is absurd to expect them to protect everyone. That is impossible. Society and morals has to play a role.

Another is *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services*, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989), this case modified the Warren case. A young boy was being abused by his father. The police had earlier made it plain that they would protect the boy by keeping the father away. The father eventually found DeShaney and beat him without mercy. The court stated: “The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament
or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” In other words, the police should have intervened before this incident because a) they already knew of the beatings and promised to keep the boy safe, and b) the boy, being young, was not able to help himself.

In terms of force, police are normally highly trained in its use. Despite heavy media treatment, police brutality is quite rare, partially due to training, partially due to internal discipline, and partially because it is not in the interests of the police to use it much. The overwhelming majority of abuse cases are found to be without foundation.

The fact that the numbers are so low is surprising, given the endless number of well armed, often insane, organized and experienced criminals police must deal with every day. As violent crime continued to skyrocket from the early 1960s onward, there would be no surprise if police overreacted with violence. It would be mere self-preservation. Arch Puddington made the claim that reports of police brutality are wildly exaggerated. First of all, most mayors and police chiefs in American cities are black, and for most American cities, police forces are mostly non-white. Secondly, the context of complaints is rarely understood and rarely reported in detail.

Third, as criminals become better armed, police reactions using “excessive” force might well be justified. Since criminals outgun and outnumber police by a huge margin, it is surprising that the numbers of police brutality figures are as low as they are. In Los Angeles, there are about 9,800 police officers (that includes bureaucrats and those otherwise not on the street). The majority are non-white. Fourth, every criminal has an interest in making a claim of police brutality. It would set them free on a procedural technicality. Fifth, serious accusations of brutality are not just investigated by local internal affairs, but by federal agencies as well. Police brutality is in no one's interest. Many of the reports that show brutality being “endemic” only deal with complaints, not convictions. As Puddington himself claims, most of the reports on this phenomenon are conducted by groups with strong liberal or leftist leanings such as the Urban League, the ACLU, Amnesty International or Harvard University.

Even more, the 1996 study by the Justice Department shows the myth of police brutality. Many studies have shown that force is rarely used by police, roughly 0.15% of arrests use some kind of force. 897 officers were assaulted in 1996 in the state of Virginia alone. In major cities, the overwhelming majority of citizen complaints are found to be false. In Virginia, out of 119 complaints, only 20 were sustained. The fact is that investigations of complaints are handled by multiple organizations, often with no specific connection to police.

In the last decade, the average number of police deaths per year is about 153, that comes out to roughly 1,540 over the last 10 years. Injuries by criminals average about 16,000 yearly. Assaults (whether they led to injury or not) average almost 60,000 a year. The highest was in 1973, with 240 deaths in the line of duty. This is also brutality.

In general terms, the ratio between commanders and the lower ranks make it very difficult to enforce ethical behavior. Yet, leadership is a key element. Setting the tone and standard, both in public and at the station, is essential. This means that discipline should be tough but fair, and that high ranking officers should never play favorites. Objectivity must remain the standard. Giving the impression that there is always “wiggle room” can cause endless problems.

Since supervising policemen, especially experienced ones, is very difficult, enforcement can only be haphazard. The culture of the police itself must oppose unethical behavior and maintain high standards. In 1996, a major symposium was held under the aegis of the Justice Department on police integrity. One comment that continued to be repeated was one that has today become famous: “The major cause in the lack of integrity in American police officers
is mediocrity.”

This one-liner summed up the “cultural” problem in certain police departments. Laziness, low standards, cynicism, and tolerance of problematic behavior eventually create a culture where unethical acts are not punished. This means that even the good officers, seeing that poor behavior does not get dealt with, might easily turn bad (Parks, 2000).

The report filed by the LAPD into the causes of police corruption laid out the following variables: first, a lack of leadership. This does not refer to charisma, but the maintenance of a rational and orderly structure of power where command and control can proceed smoothly. Second, turnover or other radical changes in the department or the neighborhood can cause a lack of connection to one's surroundings. Third, at least in the Los Angeles case, there was no attention paid to compatibility: in many areas, high ranking officers did not like each other and competed for respect. This is an important, yet often overlooked, cause of corruption.

Fourth, poor working conditions, long hours and a sense of hopelessness can create a level of cynicism that sees nothing wrong with the occasional act of corruption. The real problem is how this eventually leaks out into the public. There is a substantial literature that the level of crime and disorder in a region has a powerful role to play in shaping attitudes towards the police. In a high crime neighborhood, public knowledge that the police might be crooked is sufficient to distrust them. The main issue with corruption then, relative to public opinion, is the level of trust. If there is no trust, then the policeman's job becomes that much more difficult.

According to a report by the state of Washington, those convicted in trafficking drugs, offenders are almost always charged with the most serious (in the case of multiple charges). Usually, in order to facilitate a plea, the charges will be reduced. Whether or not the defendant pleads guilty at the trial is one of the most important elements in sentencing.

Circumstances of the arrest are just as important. The variable is whether the trafficker was arrested in the course of a sting or stake-out operation. These are usually more serious charges. Charges will not be reduced in the case of an undercover operation, since intent is so blatantly clear. The report states:

The findings of greatest importance to this study are those regarding the effects of race and ethnicity. Controlling for the arresting offense, and other legal and non-legal factors, we have found no significant differences between white, African American and Hispanic defendants in the seriousness of the initial charge filed, or in the filing of deadly-weapon and school-zone enhancements. While race and ethnic differences do appear in the initial filing of multiple counts, there are no differences in the likelihood of conviction on multiple counts (Parks, 64)

The Report on Minorities and the Courts sponsored by the University of Nebraska says that racial bias in the court system is a matter of perception not fact. The author states that concerns differ among groups. Blacks are most worried about representation on the bench, Hispanics worried about interpreter services, and Indians worried about jurisdictional issues. She concludes that perception of the courts has to with prior experience in the courts and not group membership per se.

William Wilbanks puts the matter to rest in his 1987 Myth of the Racist Criminal Justice System. He argues in several different ways. First, there is a correlation between crime and the belief that you will not be treated fairly by the system. This is self-perpetuation. Media bias creates racial disturbances. For example, in 1980, white policemen killed a black biker in Florida
The media reported over and again that the prosecution's case was a lock. They lost, and a riot ensued. As it turns out, Florida media had no evidence whatsoever that the prosecution had a strong case, and created their reports for the exclusively purpose of creating racial tension and sensationalization.

Secondly, he argues that all races commit crimes of race, yet, even blacks are often willing to give whites a break more than other blacks. Many decision makers in the justice system have a tendency to favor blacks over whites. There is no overall reason to hold that, in terms of courtroom procedure, one race is privileged over another. He argues in addition that proving one way or another is extremely difficult, and neither side has so far succeeded. One of the reasons for this is the lack of a definition for “racism.” It changes constantly. It is not mere over-representation or harsher punishments. The decision must be made on some principle that group is criminal, while group y is not. There is no evidence that this exists.

Larry Elder, a black columnist and journalist, holds that the criminal justice system is not systematically racist. What has happened is that media have deliberately placed this suggestion into the public mind. He argues this way: There is no racial connection in sentencing. In 1994, the Justice department found that inner city sentencing rates were lower than for other areas relative to the crime. The severity of sentencing concerning cocaine versus crack is another myth. In fact, it was the Congressional Black Caucus that demanded harsher sentences for crack possession, since they were tearing the inner city apart. So the system was racist for not punishing crack dealers harshly, now, they are racist for doing so.

In 2010, blacks were about 30% of all drug related arrests. Arrests for drug offenses account for about 12.4% of non-traffic arrests and represent only about 14.2% of the offenses for which blacks were incarcerated according to him.

Perceptions of the police by the public are predicated mostly on neighborhood conditions and one's history of interaction with the police in the past. The (2003) study from the National Institute of Justice does not see race or ethnicity as important, statistically speaking, as neighborhood conditions. The higher the crime rate of the area, the lower the opinion of the police. This particular study took place in Los Angeles, taking different parts of the city into consideration. An ethnic and racial cross section of the city and county were analyzed. Levels of social cohesion were positively correlated with high opinions of the police. Levels of informal, that is customary or traditional controls are equally correlated.

What these two mean together are levels of trust. People getting along, families stable and the economy livable are the basic variables here. The study measured levels of fear, disorder, violence and cohesion within the specific community. Even with high levels of violence, approval of the police averaged around 72-73%. High levels of social cohesion saw approval ratings of police work at over 90%, meaning that community cohesion means a strong support of the cops. The lowest was the level of disorder. In areas with high rates of disorder in general, approval remained about 70%.

In addition to the above, racial characteristics were also taken into consideration. The results look like this:

1. Asians approved of the police at a level of around 70%.
2. Blacks about 65%, yet Latinos had a high opinion of the police, about 80%
3. Whites were almost 90% approving of police work in the region.

The study claims, however, that once the conditions of the neighborhood are taken into
consideration, these racial classifications disappear as significant. The second study if the “George Mason” study of 2001, conducted by the department of criminal justice at that university in Virginia. Here is an outline of their findings:

1. 1980s-1990s, substantial improvement in public images of the police in general nationwide.
2. The police remain a trusted institution nationwide.
3. Few perceive police brutality as a problem, but this number is increasing.
4. Unlike the report above, the treatment of local crime is not as important as how the police are likely to treat them: both as people and members of a group.
5. In contradiction to the study above, the authors here claim that neighborhood characteristics are not significant, but race is.
6. It should be noted that the majority of Hispanic, white and black Americans nationwide believe that stopping crime is not merely the job of the police, but the community as a whole.

The specific variables of the study dealing with national view of the police should be mentioned. These are:

1. Reliability: Little data available on this. The most they could say is that people expect regular and consistent service.
2. Responsiveness: People who have been crime victims have a lower view of the police on this score. Poorer neighborhoods the same.
3. Competence:
4. Manners: Almost 80% of Americans see the police as polite and helpful.
5. Fairness: there are tons of papers on this one. The main variables of significance affecting if one views the police as unfair are being non-white, having rebellious attitudes, prior contact, low socioeconomic status and having been falsely accused in the past. Education, income, occupation and sex do not seem to be significant.
6. Integrity: Since the 1970s, public perceptions of the honesty and justice of police officers has increased substantially. Those rating these variables as “high” or “very high” have increased from 37% in 1977 to 50% in 2000.

The Erez study of 1984 showed that police do not pursue, question or approach blacks any more than whites. However, blacks had more contact with police overall, and this, rather than race, might be the main area of significance.

The media is essential. The media print stories designed to inflame black opinion against whites. Media reports are biased in favor of what is perceived as “anti-black” attitudes by the police. Saturation coverage of racially biased cases where white officers are acting unfairly to non-white citizens (and an almost total blackout of the reverse) has manipulated racial minorities in America to distrust the police more than whites.

University students polled assume, reflexively, that “bias crimes” by the police are always white treating black unfairly. This is even the case in areas where blacks outnumber whites on the police force, as is the case in most US cities. This strongly suggests media coverage favoring one side over the other.

The July, 2013 editorial in the Washington Times created tremendous controversy. Among
other things, it asserts a tremendous media bias in dealing with racial crime. It is difficult to deny the fact that nearly all major media outlets deliberately removed several essential facts of the case to make Martin appear innocent and harmless. NBC was even forced to fire several producers for doctoring tapes and images later played for an international audience. Putting it bluntly, Khuner states:

From the outset, liberal media outlets — CNN, MSNBC, NPR, CBS, ABC, NBC, the Huffington Post, The New York Times and The Washington Post — put forth one seminal narrative: The shooting of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was a flagrant example of white racism against blacks.

Then, after the shooting, NBC showed a picture of Zimmerman in front of the police station. He looks completely healthy. Yet, it was taken from an angle where his bruises and blood scalp could not be seen. Finally, the use of an old picture of Martin was manipulative. It shows a happy, smiling, harmless 12 year old. Of course, Martin was much older at the time of the shooting, and a big, muscular man (Hooks, 2013; Khuner, 2013).

The political and historical framework is easy to explain: Race is the single most volatile issue in American life. Charges of racism can destroy careers and reputations. The fact that Martin himself used many anti-white slurs that major media outlets ignored shows the context, and the diversity problem. Racism can be committed only by whites. The media used the term “Hispanic” about 3% of the time in the months leading up to the trial when describing Zimmerman (Hooks, 2013). They then created a new label, “white Hispanic,” a racial term never before heard. Why?

As with the Rodney King beating, key facts were removed: first, that Martin was 6'3” and a well known fighter. Martin beat Zimmerman and smashed his head to the ground. Had he not used his gun, there is every reason to believe that Zimmerman would either be dead or comatose. In the King case, key facts were also left out, namely that King was on PCP at the time, which can give superhuman strength. He was tased 5 or 6 times to no effect. They also refused to cover the several black police officers who defended the beaters at the trial. Of course, these are all essential facts that were left out to stoke the flames of race hatred. Khuner writes:

Aided and abetted by President Obama, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. and the Congressional Black Caucus, these race-arsonists have fueled the flames of racial hatred. Encouraged by media coverage that has played to the most primitive racial sensibilities, many blacks have become passionately convinced Mr. Zimmerman is guilty — not only of murder, but of hating young black men. Law enforcement authorities in Sanford are preparing for bloody race riots should he be acquitted.

This case has helped deepen the divide between whites and blacks. Whatever trust and goodwill whites and blacks have has been damaged. Most of black America is middle class and millions of black kids are in college and beyond. In the workplace, the only result can be arguments, distrust and quite possibly, physical altercations.

In the workplace itself, management needs to tackle the issue without bias. All facts need to be presented so as to blunt any undue hatred towards whites or Hispanics (and Zimmerman is also part black from his grandparents). Stating it simply, management needs to counter any media manipulation in the interests of peace. The alternative is a climate of distrust that can
destroy a diverse office, business or neighborhood.

In addition, media deliberately misquoted Zimmerman many times to inflame non-whites. For example, they reported that he called Martin a “f****ng coon,” when the tapes clearly have him saying “its f****ng cold.” NBC fired a producer who manipulated a tape to suggest that Zimmerman's sole purpose was race baiting. Zimmerman is presently suing NBC.

The levels of black crime, especially black on white crime, go almost entirely unreported. According to the National Incident-Based Reporting System, which collects records from almost 5,000 police agencies in 23 states, as well as the Bureau of Justice Statics and the FBI, all have black Americans disproportionately involved in nearly all types of crime, but especially in the inner city, where the majority of police are black.

Blacks are 600% more likely to be victims of a murder. Blacks were more than 700% more likely to be the perpetrator of a murder than whites. Yet, all of these agencies do not separate Hispanic from white. Hence, the BJS claims that of all American homicides, 45.8% are committed by whites, yet that also includes Hispanics.

In addition, about 10% of American gang members are white, and, among the 200,000 interracial crimes committed each year, about 85% are committed by non-whites against whites according to the National Crimes Victimization Survey, which is also sponsored by the BJS. In truth, these “white gangs” include skinhead groups that are not criminal, but political in nature. Thus, the number of white gangs shrinks to almost zero.

Black author and professor Thomas Sowell writes:

Similar episodes of unprovoked violence by young black gangs against white people chosen at random on beaches, in shopping malls or in other public places have occurred in Philadelphia, New York, Denver, Chicago, Cleveland, Washington, Los Angeles and other places across the country. Both the authorities and the media tend to try to sweep these episodes under the rug as well (LR, 2012).

Sowell also authored a piece about anti-white race riots suppressed by media sources. Citing the book *White Girl Bleed a Lot: The Return of Race Riots to America* by C. Flaherty, the number of racial mob attacks against whites is constant and increasing, but no media coverage of any note. Flaherty's book details a huge number of mob acts against whites by blacks that received little or no press coverage in all 50 states, including several hundred incidents on 4th of July alone. No major book publisher would touch it.

*Presumed Guilty*, the insider story of the Rodney King case by the white policemen who were accused of brutality, would not be published by any major press. A conservative press eventually published the book.

To a great extent, hate crimes against whites have increased substantially due to the Trayvon Martin saturation coverage. Two black teenagers in Oak Park IL beat up whites at random over the Trayvon Martin case, according to the *Chicago Sun Times*. *The Gainesville Sun* reports on mob violence against whites, with blacks chanting Trayvon's name. These incidents are becoming more common.

In 1987, due to charges of “racism,” the Houston police department altered their physical force policy. They especially changed the policies on how and when their little pistols were to be fired. For example, they are not permitted to fire warning shots. There must be an immediate threat of officer death in order to justify the discharge of a weapon. Officers will not fire at a
moving vehicle. The reform policy states:

Consequently, no officer will be disciplined for discharging a firearm in self-defense or in defense of another when faced with a situation that immediately threatens life or serious bodily injury. Just as important, no officer will be disciplined for not discharging a firearm if that discharge might threaten the life or safety of an innocent person, or if the discharge is not clearly warranted by the policy and rules of the department.

Of course, this tells us nothing. How can an officer know what situation will become one in which his life is threatened? How can an officer possible measure that, especially in the heat of the moment. What of context? To think that a policeman will not be more jumpy in a high crime inner city area versus a rural idyll is absurd. To blame an officer for that is to create an impossible standard. A police officer, under this set of laws, is supposed to go through a series of fairly complex moral calculations as he is being confronted a gang culture that in some states, outnumbers law enforcement by 10:1.

Imagine a circumstance where a group of good cops is confronted by a judicial system that refuses to punish serious offenders. Prisons become revolving door agencies and the police are arresting the same people over and over again. According to the DOJ, about 65% of prisoners released are rearrested within three years. Now, imagine that the public begins to notice this. What is the rational police response? The traditional response is for the police to, as always, suck it up and do what they are supposed to. Now, these same policemen are dealing with organized crime in a region where the criminals are capable of exploiting every obscure loophole in the law. Lawyers are trained to find the most minute technicality that can throw out an entire case. What, again is the rational response?

Due process can be destructive to law enforcement. Obsession with the letter of the law sets criminals free, leaving those not so legally adept to face prison. The problem is that the police must follow the law. They are highly constrained in what they can do. The criminals, who outnumber and out-gun police departments, have no such constraints.

Is there a connection between the Warren Court's revolution of law enforcement and the explosion in violence crime that occurred just a few years after the major cases like *Miranda*, *Mapp* or *Ohio*? How can abstractions such as the “equality of rights under the law” make any sense whatsoever when street gangs easily outnumber and outgun the budget-constrained and insecure police? If profiling is such a problem, then what do scrupulous cops do when they realize that 95% of American gangs are non-white? Do they begin frisking more white suburbanites for the sake of appearances?

Street gangs target law enforcement as part of their initiation process. Estimates vary, but in most cities, gangs have far more members than police departments, do not follow any rule of law, and have access to surveillance equipment, heavy weaponry and the court system that is tilted in their favor. Making matters worse, street gangs have long since been penetrated by the Black Panther party, the Nation of Islam and numerous other extremist cults and sects. Hence, not only are the gangs extremely powerful, they have an ideology to justify their behavior. And yet, the onus continually is placed on the shoulders of the police.

There are about 30,000 gangs in the US with a membership estimated at 1.4 million active members. They are militarized. Since 2009 gang membership has increased by 40%, with most of the recruiting coming from recent immigrants from Latin America. They are encouraged
to get employment in the military or law enforcement fields. They have their own intelligence services and codes. In Mexico, Los Zetas narcotics cartel has taken the next logical step: openly confronting law enforcement and defeating them in open combat.

Gangs have a disciplined structure, an entire language of their own, and, when things get rough, the ACLU is there to bail them out. Now, they are forming alliances with each other not just domestically, but also over the border into the narcotics gangs in Mexico. According to the FBI, gangs have formed disciplined paramilitary units, have infiltrated law enforcement, and have more money now than ever, precisely at a time when police budgets are being cut. In California, the ratio of law enforcement to gang membership is 1:8. In Texas, it is between 1:4-6.

The FBI report states:

Gang members armed with high-powered weapons and knowledge and expertise acquired from employment in law enforcement, corrections, or the military will likely pose an increasing nationwide threat, as they employ these tactics and weapons against law enforcement officials, rival gang members, and civilians. Associates, friends, and family members of gangs will continue to play a pivotal role in the infiltration and acquisition of sensitive information.

Yet, the police seem to have no voice. They seem to lack the outrage that any other group so targeted would show. Daily, police are shown on the media as thugs beating up innocent non-whites for no reason. The FBI continues:

Conversely, limited resources and budget cuts have reportedly constrained many law enforcement agencies’ ability to target and dismantle gangs in their jurisdiction. Law enforcement officials nationwide report that budget issues have affected their agency’s gang unit or task force and subsequently their ability to combat gangs in their region.

Yet, the ACLU states,

Overreaction to gang problems, which is driven by the assumption that those who associate with known gang members must be involved in criminal activity, even in the absence of concrete evidence that this is the case. This includes illegal mass stops and arrests, and demanding photo IDs from young men based on their race and dress instead of on their criminal conduct.

The ACLU then advocates “control” over the police lest they be too “brutal” to gang members. They also advocate dismantling police intelligence units and to reduce physical force against criminals to the absolute minimum. They advocate, instead, that “the community” spy on the police to keep them in line. The fact that police departments seem helpless to defend themselves against this level of contempt shows that police departments are far from powerful. The inability to fight back against gangs is not the fault of the police, but the welter of laws that make it impossible to compete with disciplined groups that do not need to follow the law. The fact that the ACLU is financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Institute, shows that these policies are backed by the elite of society.

The Kerner Commission was called to deal with the root causes of the race riots of the
1960s. Predictably, they concluded that “black frustration” with the “lack of economic opportunity” were at the root of crime. Exonerating the rioters from their actions, they held that the black population cannot help themselves except to commit acts of violence. Even ultra-liberal Lyndon Johnson rejected the report, especially since it had come out right after major voting rights and civil rights reforms. Nearly every reason given by this elite board panel had to do with the evils of white America. That the majority of America's poor and dispossessed were white and rural did not seem to cross their minds.

The President's Commission On Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was convened in 1966-1967. while not dealing with the “structural causes” as the Kerner commission did, this commission dealt mostly with the structure of law enforcement itself. Their point was profound: the Constitution was written in an agricultural, lightly populated society that had far stricter morals and punishments than today. The Constitution was written for a time before high technology, machine guns, or the drug epidemic. In a particularly telling passage, the commission states, concerning police work:

That a policeman's duties compel him to exercise personal discretion many times every day is evident. Crime does not look the same on the street as it does in a legislative chamber. How much noise or profanity makes conduct "disorderly" within the meaning of the law? When must a quarrel be treated as a criminal assault: at the first threat or at the first shove or at the first blow, or after blood is drawn, or when a serious injury is inflicted? How suspicious must conduct be before there is "probable cause," the constitutional basis for an arrest? Every policeman, however complete or sketchy his education, is an interpreter of the law.

The police are not the problem. They have no interest in stirring up trouble when they cannot handle the trouble they have. Law enforcement is put in an impossible position: they are blamed when the are too harsh. They are blamed when they are too lenient. Gangs are mostly non-white, but the mere utterance of that fact can destroy careers. Thus, law enforcement has to pretend that crime is color blind. Any interaction with a non-white suspect has the potential to destroy a career or set of a riot that might last for days. Yet, the police, insecure, underfunded and overworked, seem to have no means of fighting back.

It is extremely rare that a commission, report or activist blog ever sees the world from the policeman's point of view. He is a stoic robot, albeit a terribly flawed one. Not all reforms should come from law enforcement. “Citizen's groups” should be more concerned with the domination of the streets by narcotic-fueled ideological cults with machine guns than an officer that hits a suspect twice instead of once. This is the legacy of the Warren Court and the Commissions of the 1960s.

The Fourth Amendment states that citizens should be secure in their possessions. Thus, the state does not have the right to search or seize one's property except when legitimate probable cause of a crime exists. For this to be formalized, a warrant from the judicial authority is needed.

Last time I checked, police are also individuals, and as such, actually possess rights. They are not machines that can be programmed to do what politicians want. They face well armed drug dealers, gangs and criminals daily. As these problems get worse and the police continue to see budgets cut and weapons downgraded, there is every reason to believe that police have the right to compensate by the increased use of force. Policemen have a right to their own survival,
to defend themselves, and to react in a defensive or offensive manner in areas where crime and violence are rife.

On the one hand, all will agree that the police should be independent and apolitical. They cannot be used for the recently elected governor to get back at the kid who beat him up in third grade. Yet, police responses to criminal activity do not take place in a vacuum. Take Detroit for example. The police force there has been cut in half over the last ten years. Crime is not only out of control, but itself has become a political force with a great degree of organized power. Due to budget cuts, the anti-gang task-force was abandoned, and pay cuts distributed to all personnel.

To claim that crime has “fallen” in in many urban areas is a myth. It comes from the fact that police departments have been demoralized and shrunk in size. In Detroit, about 20% of the city is off limits to police, especially in the gang controlled Northeastern sections of the city. Most of the public works have disappeared. Unemployment is about 60%. Police solve less than 10% of reported crimes. In 1991, Detroit had 5,000 officers. That has been halved, and many more cutbacks are planned. Most police stations are closed for the public on an average of 16 hours per day. In 2012, the police let visitors to the city know that they cannot guarantee their safety. Civilization had fallen apart.

The most common causes of judicial action against police are false arrest, failure to intervene, excessive force and malicious prosecution. In the abstract, of course, no one would defend such actions. Yet, when morale collapses, gangs outgun the police and citizens pay the price, standards change. They move from concerns about the rights of criminals to the rights of the city and the common good.

In high crime areas where police forces have been cut while gang power has increased, false arrests are to be expected. Malicious prosecution might be justified in order to get a well connected mobster off the streets. Failure to intervene might be the result of the inability of the police to successfully defend themselves while excessive force is too relative to be taken seriously.

Like Detroit, Los Angeles has been overrun by well armed gangs while the police force has been cut by at least one third, with more on the way. Their anti-terrorism task force has been disbanded for lack of funds. From 2000-2004, the LAPD lost 1000 officers. Cuts have been so severe that Los Angeles has one policeman per 500 residents. In New York City, it is one policeman for every 250 residents.

On the other hand, the gang population stands at about 120,000. From 2005-2007, gang violence in certain areas of the city increased by 115%. Conviction rates in the inner city judicial system are extremely low (about 30%), and therefore, police morale is non-existent.

The question uses words that have little meaning given the reality of the situation: “authority” “exceeded,” or “adequate protection” do not make sense when the police are clearly being defeated. Police will have little choice to use increasingly violent methods as the war-zone continues to chip away at the city's stability. It is at a point right now, in those two cities, that pretty much anything the police can do to stop crime is justifiable. Such comments would be out of place in Lynwood, CA, but not northeast Detroit.

In New York City, on the other hand, police are becoming afraid to pull over any driver that is non-white. If there are more stops of non-white drivers, the police are ipso facto declared racist. The fact that the majority of the police are black has not become an issue. The claim is that since more non-whites are stopped than whites, racism is already proved. Of course, the city is majority non-white and, unfortunately, violent crimes are the domain of non-white gangs. Blacks are 36% of NYC’s population, but are responsible for 73% of shootings in 2011.
Whites are responsible for 3% of shootings, though their proportion of the population is identical to the black numbers. Tying police hands can only hurt the very non-white people the city is seeking to protect. The criminal elements in these communities are fairly small, but revolving door prison systems, the refusal to convict and constant recidivism has destroyed what would be a decent area to live.

Hence, on the one hand, the state is being used to promote the financial interests of developers while a state of emergency has long been in effect (de facto) in America's inner cities for 50 years. As neighborhoods bury dozens of victims, the only attacks seem to be made on the police. In Mexico, civilian deaths in that country's drug war recently topped 40,000. In the US, the 12 largest cities suffered 3200 deaths due to gang and drug related violence in 2011. This is apparently an acceptable sacrifice in the drive to hold police accountable for their actions.

The simple facts are these:

1. The police are losing the war on crime, all kinds of crime. Their numbers are shrinking as criminal gangs are growing.
2. The police are blamed for every error made, while the behavior of defendants is not brought under consideration. More errors will be made as police come under more pressure. This is understandable and inevitable. Condemning them for it is the height of insensitivity.
3. Police are held to abstract standards that have no relation to their daily life. In fact, the daily life of inner city cops is not mentioned at all.
4. Police have every reason, right and duty to take violent action, even in defiance of the law, in order to destroy gangs and other well armed para-military organizations in America's cities. Since places like Detroit and Los Angeles are beyond a state of emergency condition, this is justified both legally and morally.
5. The police have just as much a right for survival and safety as any other citizen. This often gets forgotten.
6. The huge number of civilian deaths in Mexico and the US due to drugs and gang violence is at the scale of a substantial war. The police are not the problem. The level of crime, the small numbers of the police and media bias all demand that police take matters into their own hands for the sake of their own safety and that of the cities they serve. It might not be pretty, but war never is.

In such a context, police violence may well be justified as an emergency measure to stay alive and at least hold the line against the most violent of crimes. As most of the streetlights no longer work and public vehicles are so old that the average mileage on one is almost 300,000 miles, judging police behavior according to abstract concepts of justice is absurd. In the Detroit case, the standard should be quite low for police behavior, given the simple fact that they are outnumbered and outgunned.

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